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Skeptical Theism: New Essays$
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Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199661183

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.001.0001

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Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism

Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism

(p.3) 1 Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism
Skeptical Theism: New Essays

Jonathan D. Matheson

Oxford University Press

Recently there has been a good deal of interest in the relationship between common-sense epistemology and skeptical theism. Much of the debate has focused on phenomenal conservatism and any tension that there might be between it and skeptical theism. This chapter shows the compatibility of phenomenal conservatism and skeptical theism by coupling these views with an account of defeat. Further, it argues that this account of defeat can give the skeptical theist what she wants—namely a response to the evidential argument from evil that can leave one of its premises unmotivated. Along the way, this account responds to several objections from Trent Dougherty and Chris Tucker as well as to an additional worry coming from the epistemology of disagreement.

Keywords:   skeptical theism, problem of evil, phenomenal conservatism, common-sense epistemology, the argument from evil, epistemology of disagreement

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