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Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy Volume VI$
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Daniel Garber and Donald Rutherford

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199659593

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659593.001.0001

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Epistemological Commitment in Hume’s Treatise

Epistemological Commitment in Hume’s Treatise

Chapter:
(p.309) 10 Epistemological Commitment in Hume’s Treatise
Source:
Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy Volume VI
Author(s):

Louis E. Loeb

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659593.003.0010

In Treatise I.iii, Hume self-consciously presupposes that causal inference is justified. Whereas Locke confined association to unreasonable belief, the main project of I.iii is to show that induction can also be explained associationistically. This picture is not unfriendly to the interpretation of I.iii—associated with Garrett and Owen—as an exercise in cognitive psychology. In confirming the psychological theory, however, Hume introduces associationist mechanisms that are psychologically similar to those underpinning legitimate causal inference, though patently unreasonable. The psychological similarities exert pressure on Hume to introduce and endorse a handful of epistemic discriminations, differentiating causal inference from resemblance and contiguity, education, and unphilosophical probability. This project is normative. Taking the I.iii distinctions in conjunction with that in I.iv.4 between two kinds of imaginative principles, Hume advances a system of increasingly specialized epistemic discriminations. The availability of this structure suggests continuity in Hume’s interest in normative epistemology in I.iii and I.iv

Keywords:   association, cognitive psychology, education, Garrett, Don, Hume, induction, Locke, normative epistemology, resemblance, probability, unphilosophical

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