E & ¬H*
E & ¬H*
Suppose you have evidence E for H. What reason do you have for believing that your evidence isn’t misleading? That is, what reason do you have for believing (E & H)? Two very plausible, related principles imply that E itself can’t provide empirical justification for believing (E & H). The Entailment Principle says that if Y entails X, X can’t justify Y. The Confirmation Principle says that X can’t justify Y unless X raises the probability of Y. The chapter argues that E can indeed justify (E & H), and that both principles are false. Further conclusions are: Epistemic closure withstands recent criticisms due to Fred Dretske; we don’t have a priori reasons for rejecting (E & H); the dogmatist reply to scepticism is unscathed by a challenge posed by Roger White; and there is a promising response to the New Riddle of Induction.
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