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Scepticism and Perceptual Justification$
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Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199658343

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001

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E & ¬H*

E & ¬H*

Chapter:
(p.87) 5 E & ¬H*
Source:
Scepticism and Perceptual Justification
Author(s):

Jonathan Vogel

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.003.0005

Suppose you have evidence E for H. What reason do you have for believing that your evidence isn’t misleading? That is, what reason do you have for believing (E & H)? Two very plausible, related principles imply that E itself can’t provide empirical justification for believing (E & H). The Entailment Principle says that if Y entails X, X can’t justify Y. The Confirmation Principle says that X can’t justify Y unless X raises the probability of Y. The chapter argues that E can indeed justify (E & H), and that both principles are false. Further conclusions are: Epistemic closure withstands recent criticisms due to Fred Dretske; we don’t have a priori reasons for rejecting (E & H); the dogmatist reply to scepticism is unscathed by a challenge posed by Roger White; and there is a promising response to the New Riddle of Induction.

Keywords:   a priori justification, Closure Principle, confirmation, defeaters, dogmatism, evidence, induction, misleading evidence, scepticism, theory choice

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