McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism, etc.*
McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism, etc.*
This chapter approaches some fundamental questions in perceptual epistemology through a dispute between McDowell and Wright about external-world scepticism. The dispute turns on what McDowell means by claiming that we have ‘direct perceptual access to environmental facts’. On the recommended interpretation, if we do have ‘direct perceptual access’ then the relevant sceptical argument fails. It fails anyway for other reasons; moreover, these reasons provide materials for defending McDowell’s claim of ‘direct perceptual access’.
Keywords: disjunctivism, McDowell, perception, scepticism, Wright
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