Self-Knowledge for Humans
Quassim Cassam
Abstract
Rationalism about self-knowledge, of the kind elaborated and defended by writers such as Moran and Boyle, is an account of self-knowledge for an ideally rational homo philosophicus rather than for homo sapiens. Fast thinking, belief-perseverance, attitude-recalcitrance, and self-ignorance are all respects in which human beings are not homo philosophicus. Rationalism says that what my beliefs and other attitudes are can be determined by reflecting on what they ought rationally to be. This Transparency Method for acquiring self-knowledge is of limited value, and substitutes a harder question for ... More
Rationalism about self-knowledge, of the kind elaborated and defended by writers such as Moran and Boyle, is an account of self-knowledge for an ideally rational homo philosophicus rather than for homo sapiens. Fast thinking, belief-perseverance, attitude-recalcitrance, and self-ignorance are all respects in which human beings are not homo philosophicus. Rationalism says that what my beliefs and other attitudes are can be determined by reflecting on what they ought rationally to be. This Transparency Method for acquiring self-knowledge is of limited value, and substitutes a harder question for a much easier one. This book defends a form of inferentialism about self-knowledge. Inferences from behavioural and psychological evidence are a basic source of self-knowledge for humans, including substantial self-knowledge and knowledge of our own beliefs, desires, and other attitudes. On this account, the supposed asymmetry between knowledge of oneself and knowledge of others is a difference in the kinds of evidence available in the two cases. Philosophical accounts of self-knowledge are criticized for neglecting substantial self-knowledge and focusing on relatively trivial self-knowledge. Knowledge of our own character, values, and emotions are all explained in inferentialist terms. Inner sense approaches to self-knowledge are rejected, and an account is given of the scope and sources of self-ignorance. The value of self-knowledge is explained in practical or pragmatic terms, by reference to its contribution to well-being, rather than by reference to ideals such as authenticity and unity.
Keywords:
Rationalism,
Richard Moran,
Matthew Boyle,
homo philosophicus,
Transparency Method,
inferentialism,
substantial self-knowledge,
inner sense,
self-ignorance,
value
Bibliographic Information
Print publication date: 2015 |
Print ISBN-13: 9780199657575 |
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014 |
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657575.001.0001 |