One version of Normative Rationalism says not that we do approximate to homo philosophicus but that we are supposed to approximate to homo philosophicus. For Normative Rationalists like Boyle, the claim that humans are essentially rational is a claim about our essential nature rather than about how we actually think most of the time. In reply, it is argued that it is not in our nature to approximate to homo philosophicus, and that it is in our nature not to be, or even come close to being, model epistemic citizens. A different version of Normative Rationalism says that we ought to be like homo philosophicus, but this can’t be a moral ‘ought’. The respects in which we aren’t like homo philosophicus aren’t necessarily bad for us and might in certain circumstances enhance our psychological well-being.
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