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Self-Knowledge for Humans$
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Quassim Cassam

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780199657575

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657575.001.0001

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Self-Knowledge for Philosophers

Self-Knowledge for Philosophers

Chapter:
(p.38) 4 Self-Knowledge for Philosophers
Source:
Self-Knowledge for Humans
Author(s):

Quassim Cassam

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657575.003.0004

Recent philosophical accounts of self-knowledge have concentrated on particular self-knowledge, knowledge of one’s particular mental states. For Burge, particular self-knowledge is necessary for critical reasoning, but Peacocke shows that this is not so. The concentration on particular self-knowledge can also be explained by reference to the suggestion that it is epistemologically distinctive. However, this distinctiveness has frequently been exaggerated by epistemologists, and it is in any case a mistake to allow the agenda for the philosophy of self-knowledge to be set by narrow epistemological concerns. The epistemology of substantial self-knowledge is less straightforward than is generally assumed, and deserves much greater philosophical attention than it has tended to receive.

Keywords:   particular self-knowledge, Tyler Burge, Christopher Peacocke, critical reasoning, epistemology, substantial self-knowledge, philosophy

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