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Knowing Right From Wrong$
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Kieran Setiya

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199657452

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657452.001.0001

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Human Nature

Human Nature

Chapter:
(p.128) 4 Human Nature
Source:
Knowing Right From Wrong
Author(s):

Kieran Setiya

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657452.003.0005

This chapter solves the problem posed in chapter three. We can make sense of ethical knowledge without social convergence or relativism if ethical facts are connected with our beliefs through the natural history of human life. The chapter develops a conception of human nature that supports this possibility, relates the conditions of knowledge to those of justified belief, and considers the implications of its approach. It follows from the account of ethical knowledge in terms of natural history that human beings are by nature reliable in ethics, though individuals or whole societies may go astray. The book ends by arguing that it is rational to hope, and to believe, that this is true.

Keywords:   convergence, disagreement, epistemology, ethics, explanation, human nature, justification, knowledge, relativism, reliability

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