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Knowing Right From Wrong$
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Kieran Setiya

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199657452

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657452.001.0001

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Introduction

Introduction

Chapter:
(p.1) Introduction
Source:
Knowing Right From Wrong
Author(s):

Kieran Setiya

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657452.003.0001

The introduction describes three sceptical arguments about ethical objectivity: the argument from disagreement, the argument from reliability and coincidence, and the argument from accidental truth. After summarizing the chapters that address these arguments, it explains and defends an assumption they share: the so-called ‘supervenience’ of the ethical.

Keywords:   coincidence, disagreement, epistemology, ethics, reliability, scepticism, supervenience

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