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Scepticism and Reliable Belief$
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José L. Zalabardo

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199656073

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.001.0001

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Knowledge Without Evidence

Knowledge Without Evidence

(p.111) 6 Knowledge Without Evidence
Scepticism and Reliable Belief

José L. Zalabardo

Oxford University Press

This chapter presents an account of non-inferential knowledge. It argues that non-inferential knowledge can take two forms. The first is truth tracking. The chapter follows Sherrilyn Roush in using a probabilistic construal of the notion, but the specific account that I defend differs in important respects from Roush’s. Truth tracking is construed here as a high tracking ratio (p(Bel(A) | A) / p(Bel(A) | ~A)), and a high level of safety (p(A | Bel(A))). The chapter considers how the theory can handle the standard counterexamples to tracking accounts. The second form that non-inferential knowledge can take is knowledge by default. The chapter argues that for standing beliefs, that don’t result from the operation of a cognitive mechanism, truth is a sufficient condition for knowledge.

Keywords:   non-inferential knowledge, basic knowledge, knowledge by default, truth-tracking, probability, sensitivity, adherence, safety, Sherrilyn Roush, closure

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