This chapter argues that Lockean persons extend themselves into the past by appropriation and that they are modes rather than substances. This interpretation of Locke's account of personal identity has several advantages. It clarifies how persons can enter into the demonstrative science of morality. It provides an account of how persons and the associated thinking substances relate. It explains why Locke thinks that the methodology of 2.27 yields real, non-trifling knowledge. It explains how Locke can insist both that only substances exercise power and that persons are the only appropriate locus of moral responsibility. And finally, it shows how 2.27 is consistent with Locke's anti-essentialism.
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