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The SelfNaturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance$
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Jonardon Ganeri

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199652365

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.001.0001

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The Self as Bodily

The Self as Bodily

(p.112) 6 The Self as Bodily
The Self

Jonardon Ganeri

Oxford University Press

A theory of self must do two things. It must tell us what kind of thing a self is: an immaterial substance; a suitably interconnected series of conscious experiences; the categorical basis of such a series; an animal body; and so on. But a theory of self must also give us materials to answer the question, “Which one is me?” This question is often overlooked, but to neglect it is to court solipsism. Many theories of self fail precisely because their solutions to the first requirement imply that there is no answer to the second. This chapter presses the case for the view that selves are indeed essentially embodied: that, even if Animalism is indeed false, one may well still want to maintain that selfhood requires embodiment, and perhaps more strongly, that selves are individuated according to bodily criteria: that an “embodied mind” thesis is true. It distinguishes that thought from another, less convincing, idea - that there is a “core self” consisting in an invariant presence of bodily feeling.

Keywords:   embodiment, embodied mind, bodily transfer, core self, Attenuation, bodily feeling

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