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The SelfNaturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance$
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Jonardon Ganeri

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199652365

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.001.0001

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(p.98) 5 Persistence
The Self

Jonardon Ganeri

Oxford University Press

This chapter covers the issue of the material constitution of the self and its identity over time. Animalism is the view that a person is identical with the human animal and not with either an immaterial soul or a psychological continuum. Jayanta, the ninth century Nyāya philosopher, argues very tellingly against Animalism. His argument is that the manner of persistence involved in the preservation of first‐person phenomena and other capacities constitutive of selfhood is not the same as that which characterises the persistence of physical objects. This chapter shows that the Animalism this argument targets is logically independent of the account of the emergence of the mental from the physical described in the last chapter, which therefore survives the critique unscathed.

Keywords:   Animalism, persistence, Jayanta, materialism

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