Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The SelfNaturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jonardon Ganeri

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199652365

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 February 2020

The Distinctness of Selves

The Distinctness of Selves

Chapter:
(p.304) 16 The Distinctness of Selves
Source:
The Self
Author(s):

Jonardon Ganeri

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.003.0018

It follows from the Nyāya‐Vaiśeṣika conception of self that there is a multiplicity of distinct individual selves. The account of how they are distinct distances the theory from any Cartesian conceptions of self, which are faced by the threat that in the limit “there is absolutely nothing left to distinguish any Cartesian ‘I’ from any other, and it is impossible to see any more what would be subtracted from the universe by the removal of me”. Selves are individuated in terms of a common ownership relation obtaining between clusters of commitments, resolutions and intentions, delimited by normative emotional response and implying agency and sentience and so embodiment. Historically it would be a decluttered version of the Nyāya‐Vaiśeṣika view that would gain prominence in early modern India, perhaps because of the distinctive support it affords to an increasingly secular conception of autonomous agency. An early modern Nyāya thinker will recommend that once liberated the distinction between selves is dissolved, and he thereby preserves individuation by embodied mental life and rejects altogether an earlier doctrine of brute individual difference. Any imagined state of discarnate existence is not the existence of a self, and does not represent the survival of any individual.

Keywords:   distinct selves, individuation, ipseity, Early Modern India, Cartesian self, agency, dentience, embodiment

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .