According to a theory first advanced in detail by Kaṇāda's reinterpreter, Praśastapāda, the core attributes of an emotion are an appraisal, an inclination to action and a capacity to be felt. Pleasure, for example, is elicited by the appraisal of something as likeable or pleasant, is exhibited in an inclination to maintain a continuing relationship with the object, and is felt as agreeable or gratifying or favourable. Desire is elicited by the appraisal of something not at hand as potentially so, is exhibited in an inclination to create a relationship with it, and is felt as a ‘calling out.’ Emotions serve to indicate a relation of common ownership among the commitments, values, preferences and intentions of a single subject. For a state to be owned is therefore precisely for it to engage the whole of one's being through its potential to make normative demands on any other owned state: this is part of what gives substance to the ideas of inhabitation, participation and endorsement that attributions of ownership imply. Ownership entails embodiment because some of these demands can be satisfied only in action. The concept of ownership introduced in the analysis of emotion is different from that of phenomenologically immersed “mineness” or unconscious procedural access. It is a normative concept of endorsement and sustains a third dimension of selfhood, the “participant self”.
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