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The SelfNaturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance$
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Jonardon Ganeri

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199652365

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.001.0001

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The Mind‐Body Problem

The Mind‐Body Problem

(p.225) 12 The Mind‐Body Problem
The Self

Jonardon Ganeri

Oxford University Press

This chapter analyses the philosophy of mind in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika thinkers. The lead idea in their work is that occupying a first‐person stance has centrally to do with the bearing of reason of the whole of one's mental life. The chapter outlines Praśastapāda's five arguments against the thesis that mental states are properties of the body (and so, indirectly, against materialism). The arguments are all attempts to give voice to a single thought: that the relationships of inhabitation and endorsement that are implied by the idea of owning a mental state, and so of occupying a first‐person stance, are fundamentally different in kind from any relation of physical exemplification. This phase in the argument is one of negative dialectic, its function to show that the apparent simplicity of the Cārvāka view that mental properties are just properties of the physical body comes at a high price when the debts of explanation it incurs are appreciated..

Keywords:   Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Praśastapāda, Unity, Self-Reference, Self-Knowledge, Spatial Parts, Persistence

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