This chapter argues that trust is a complex attitude with a component of belief, a component of feeling, and a behavioral component. These components are present in standard cases of epistemic trust as well as trust in the practical domain. It is reasonable to have all of the components of basic epistemic self-trust and trust in others. Epistemic self-trust includes the following: (a) we believe that our faculties will get us to the truth and that we can be harmed if they produce falsehoods, (b) we feel trusting towards our faculties for that purpose, and (c) we treat them as if they will get us to the truth. The chapter then argues that basic epistemic trust in others is a commitment of epistemic self-trust. Many of the intellectual virtues are either enhancements of epistemic trust or constraints on it.
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