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AbstractionismEssays in Philosophy of Mathematics$
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Philip A Ebert and Marcus Rossberg

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780199645268

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645268.001.0001

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Hale and Wright on the Metaontology of Neo-Fregeanism

Hale and Wright on the Metaontology of Neo-Fregeanism

Chapter:
4 (p.79) Hale and Wright on the Metaontology of Neo-Fregeanism
Source:
Abstractionism
Author(s):

Matti Eklund

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645268.003.0004

A number of authors—for example Fraser MacBride, Ted Sider, Katherine Hawley, and myself—have recently discussed the issue of the metaontology of the neo-Fregeanism of Bob Hale and Crispin Wright. Underlying these discussions is the assumption that behind the neo-Fregeans’ reliance on Hume’s Principle to justify their version of platonist logicism lies some sort of reliance on a general conception of ontological questions. In a recent article, Hale and Wright respond, claiming that the commentators’ discussions in various ways misconstrue their views. I here discuss Hale and Wright’s response, stressing the substantive questions, relevant to the fate of the neo-Fregean project, that I see their discussion as leaving unresolved.

Keywords:   neo-Fregeanism, Hume’s principle, abstraction principles, platonism, logicism, Bob Hale, Crispin Wright

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