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The Ethics of Information$
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Luciano Floridi

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199641321

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199641321.001.0001

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In defence of information ethics

In defence of information ethics

Chapter:
(p.306) 16 In defence of information ethics
Source:
The Ethics of Information
Author(s):

Luciano Floridi

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199641321.003.0016

Previously, in Chapters 1 to 15, I outlined the nature and scope of information ethics. My goal in this chapter is not to convince the reader that no reasonable disagreement is possible about the value of IE as a specific approach to computer ethics or, more generally, as a macroethics. On the contrary, several of the theses defended in this book might be interesting precisely because they are also open to discussion. Rather, my goal is to remove some ambiguities, possible confusions, and mistaken objections that might prevent the correct evaluation of IE in its various interpretations, so that disagreement can become more constructive.

Keywords:   reductionism, supererogatory relativism, hypermoralism, egalitarianism, naturalistic fallacy, conservationism, pantheism, panpsychism

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