Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

A.W. Price

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199609611

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609611.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 20 October 2019

Aristotle on Eudaimonia

Aristotle on Eudaimonia

Chapter:
(p.33) A 2 Aristotle on Eudaimonia
Source:
Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle
Author(s):

A. W. Price

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609611.003.0003

Eudaimonia as the final goal of action is abstract, being equivalent to ‘acting well’. We should not view it as the totality of the goods that a life contains, which leads to insoluble problems. A life can contain incidental goods that are good in themselves, and marginally enhance a day, but are not aspects of action; these do not contribute to eudaimonia. Aristotle demands a modicum of external goods for eudaimonia, a context of action that is not simply unwelcome, and a ‘complete life’ that may be less than a lifetime. His privileging of the life of intellectual contemplation is problematic, but does not entail that one should sacrifice everything (and everyone) else to doing more mathematics.

Keywords:   eudaimonia, living well, acting well, whole, parts, final end, complete life, external goods, contemplation

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .