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After GödelPlatonism and Rationalism in Mathematics and Logic$
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Richard Tieszen

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199606207

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606207.001.0001

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Minds and Machines

Minds and Machines

(p.177) 7 Minds and Machines
After Gödel

Richard Tieszen (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Are human minds just Turing machines or some kind of computational information processors? Many scholars, including Gödel himself, have thought that the incompleteness theorems have important implications for this issue. There has been disagreement, however, about exactly what the implications, if any, are. This chapter sets out Gödel's remarks on the issue, based on his published and unpublished writings and some comments in the Nachlass. Turing's analysis of mechanical computability is briefly described. The kind of platonic rationalism developed in earlier chapters of the book is then applied to this question, resulting in the view that human monads could not be (Turing) machines. An important and novel part of the argument turns on what Husserl would regard as a genetic analysis of the claim that minds are machines. A few words in support of Gödel's rationalistic optimism are offered at the end of the chapter

Keywords:   Turing machines, incompleteness, minds, monads, absolute undecidability, intentionality, mechanism, origins, optimism

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