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Probability in the Philosophy of Religion$
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Jake Chandler and Victoria S. Harrison

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199604760

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604760.001.0001

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Actually Aid the Case for Theism?

Actually Aid the Case for Theism?

(p.209) 11 Actually Aid the Case for Theism?
Probability in the Philosophy of Religion

Joshua C. Thurow

Oxford University Press

In recent years philosophers have begun to reflect more deeply on the significance of disagreement between equally rational and well-informed peers. Many, including Richard Feldman, have argued that disagreement between such peers requires that both suspend judgement. Applying this to the religious domain and given widespread religious disagreement, Feldman’s view results in religious scepticism. This chapter questions Feldman’s view by first explaining more fully the equal weight view about disagreement, and secondly arguing that there are cases of disagreement where equal weight would result in agreement. In such cases, the belief structure and the precise location of the disagreement within it explains why agreement is rationally mandated by equal weight. Thirdly, the chapter argues that religious disagreements could be examples of such cases. Equal weight could end up rationally requiring agreement that God exists (or not, depending on the details of the disagreement).

Keywords:   disagreement, Feldman, equal weight, scepticism, religious disagreement, rationality, theism

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