Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Thinking About ReasonsThemes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker, and Margaret Olivia Little

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199604678

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604678.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 06 July 2020

Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties

Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties

(p.310) 14 Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties
Thinking About Reasons

Bart Streumer

Oxford University Press

This paper defends Frank Jackson’s argument against irreducibly normative properties from attacks by Jonathan Dancy and other non-naturalist moral realists. Jackson argues that since normative properties supervene on descriptive properties, every normative property is identical to a descriptive property. The paper discusses four objections to this argument: that the disjunctive predicate on which the argument relies cannot be formulated; that necessarily coextensive predicates do not always ascribe the same property; that the argument can be refuted by appealing to Leibniz’ Law; and that irreducibly normative properties are indispensible to deliberation. The paper argues that all of these objections fail. In doing so, it also offers two new versions of the argument. It ends by discussing three reasons why Dancy and other non-naturalists may remain unmoved.

Keywords:   irreducibly normative properties, descriptive properties, supervenience, non-naturalism, Frank Jackson, Jonathan Dancy

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .