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The Inquiring MindOn Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology$
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Jason Baehr

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199604074

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.001.0001

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Intellectual Courage

Intellectual Courage

Chapter:
(p.163) Chapter 9 Intellectual Courage
Source:
The Inquiring Mind
Author(s):

Jason Baehr

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.003.0009

This chapter provides an account of intellectual courage is defended according to which intellectual courage is a disposition to persist in a doxastic state (e.g. belief) or course of action (e.g. inquiry) aimed at an epistemic good despite the fact that doing so involves an apparent threat to one's well‐being. In the course of this defense, several additional questions and issues are addressed, including the significance of fear and danger relative to the essential “context” of intellectual courage, the sorts of states and activities in which intellectual courage can be manifested, and when or under what conditions an exercise of intellectual courage is virtuous. The upshot of this and the preceding three chapters is that some form of “autonomous” character‐based virtue epistemology is viable.

Keywords:   intellectual virtue, intellectual courage, fear and courage, doxastic voluntarism, ill‐motivated courage

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