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The Inquiring MindOn Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology$
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Jason Baehr

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199604074

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.001.0001

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The Personal Worth Conception and its Rivals

The Personal Worth Conception and its Rivals

Chapter:
(p.112) Chapter 7 The Personal Worth Conception and its Rivals
Source:
The Inquiring Mind
Author(s):

Jason Baehr

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.003.0007

The personal worth conception of intellectual virtue introduced and defended in Chapter 6 is contrasted with five other accounts of intellectual or moral virtue in the literature. The accounts of Thomas Hurka (2002) and Robert Adams (2007) are shown to have certain significant similarities to a personal worth account, but also to have certain defects that are not shared by this account. The personal worth account is then contrasted with a naturalistic account of intellectual virtue inspired by Rosalind Hursthouse's (1999) theory of moral virtue, Julia Driver's (2000) consequentialist account of intellectual virtue, and Linda Zagzebski's (1996) motivational account of intellectual virtue. Substantive objections are raised against each of these conceptions. The result is a further defense of the personal worth conception of intellectual virtue.

Keywords:   intellectual virtue, personal worth, love of truth, human flourishing, virtue and reliability, Thomas Hurka, Robert Adams, Rosalind Hursthouse, Julia Driver, Linda Zagzebski

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