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Mental Causation and Ontology$
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S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199603770

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603770.001.0001

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Agent Causation in a Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics

Agent Causation in a Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics

Chapter:
(p.173) 7 Agent Causation in a Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics
Source:
Mental Causation and Ontology
Author(s):

Jonathan D. Jacobs

Timothy O’Connor

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603770.003.0008

This paper explores the nature of metaphysical freedom within a neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of causal powers. It argues that different versions of the neo-Aristotelian metaphysics lead to rather different metaphysical accounts of free and responsible action. Specifically, it argues that (1) the most satisfactory account of human freedom within the broadly neo-Aristotelian metaphysics is agent-causal, but that (2) two different versions of the general metaphysics will lead to importance differences in the agent-causal account of freedom. Adjust the details of your general metaphysics, and the details of your account of freedom are transformed in significant ways. Action theory cannot properly be pursued in isolation from general metaphysics.

Keywords:   agent causation, causal power, emergence, freedom, responsibility

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