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Mental Causation and Ontology$
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S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199603770

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603770.001.0001

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The Identity Theory as a Solution to the Exclusion Problem

The Identity Theory as a Solution to the Exclusion Problem

Chapter:
(p.215) 9 The Identity Theory as a Solution to the Exclusion Problem
Source:
Mental Causation and Ontology
Author(s):

David Robb

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603770.003.0010

According to the identity theory, mental properties face no threat of exclusion from physical properties, for every mental property is physical. In particular, every mental property is the physical property that would otherwise threaten to preempt it with respect to physical, and especially behavioral, effects. This paper develops this identity solution to the exclusion problem and defends it from several objections. One of the main goals is to place the solution in the context of a more general ontology of properties, in particular, a trope ontology.

Keywords:   mental causation, exclusion problem, identity theory, trope, property, ontology

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