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Mental Causation and Ontology$
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S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199603770

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603770.001.0001

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Introduction

Introduction

Chapter:
(p.1) Introduction
Source:
Mental Causation and Ontology
Author(s):

S. C. Gibb

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603770.003.0001

This chapter proposes that the apparent insolubility of the problem of mental causation stems, in part, from the fact that the debate has not always been framed with sufficient ontological precision and that basing it in a plausible ontological framework will constitute a significant step towards its resolution. It is suggested that the ontological issues that are of relevance to the mental causation debate fall into three interrelated groups. The first concerns the nature of the causal relata. The second concerns the nature of a property. The third concerns the nature of the causal relation.

Keywords:   mental causation, ontology, causal relata, property, causal relation

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