Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Oxford Studies in Metaphysicsvolume 6$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199603039

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 26 May 2020

Externalism and Brain Transplants

Externalism and Brain Transplants

(p.287) 9. Externalism and Brain Transplants
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics

Rory Madden

Oxford University Press

The animalist view of personal identity, according to which we human persons are identical to animals, is arguably the simplest view of the relationship between human persons and animals. But animalism faces a serious challenge from the possibility of brain transplants. This chapter develops, on behalf of animalism, a new way of modeling such cases. The model is developed by analogy with situations of environmentally determined reference shift familiar from the literature on externalism in the philosophy of mind and language. The resulting externalist animalist model is put to work in describing a range of variant cases and in accounting for certain anti-animalist intuitions. In the final section some wider consequences are elucidated, concerning the extrinsic nature of thought, and the coherence, within a broadly materialist framework, of disembodied consciousness.

Keywords:   animalism, brain transplants, disembodied consciousness, personal identity, reference, externalism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .