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Oxford Studies in Metaphysicsvolume 6$
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Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199603039

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.001.0001

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Being Metaphysically Unsettled

Being Metaphysically Unsettled

Barnes and Williams on Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vagueness

(p.149) 4. Being Metaphysically Unsettled
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics

Matti Eklund

Oxford University Press

This chapter discusses the defence of metaphysical indeterminacy by Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams and discusses a classical and bivalent theory of such indeterminacy. Even if metaphysical indeterminacy arguably is intelligible, Barnes and Williams argue in favour of it being so and this faces important problems. As for classical logic and bivalence, the chapter problematizes what exactly is at issue in this debate. Can reality not be adequately described using different languages, some classical and some not? Moreover, it is argued that the classical and bivalent theory of Barnes and Williams does not avoid the problems that arise for rival theories.

Keywords:   vagueness, indeterminacy, metaphysical indeterminacy, bivalence, classical logic, supervaluationism, fuzzy logic

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