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Placing BlameA Theory of the Criminal Law$
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Michael S. Moore

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199599493

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.001.0001

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Causation, Rights-Violations, and Wrongdoing

Causation, Rights-Violations, and Wrongdoing

(p.333) 7 Causation, Rights-Violations, and Wrongdoing
Placing Blame

Michael Moore (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

If causing matters to degrees of blameworthiness, as was argued in chapter 5 that it does, then some idea of what causation is needs to be developed. This chapter is preliminary to a later book, Causation and Responsibility, on this topic. The chapter focuses on the discriminating power of the causal relation and on what theories of the causal relation are adequate in light of such apparent power. Sceptical and counterfactual theories are singled out for criticism in this dimension. Theories about the nature of the things related by the causal relation are also subjected to this test of adequacy. The idea that events are the only causal relata is rejected, while the idea that states (but not objects) is accepted. A variety of more promising theories of the causal relation are briefly considered.

Keywords:   cause, counterfactual, scepticism, necessary conditions, extensionality, states, events, causal relata, tropes

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