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Placing BlameA Theory of the Criminal Law$
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Michael S. Moore

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199599493

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.001.0001

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The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing

The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing

(p.191) 5 The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing
Placing Blame

Michael Moore (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

A fundamental division within the theory of responsibility is between those who think that causation of a harm attempted or culpably risks increases blameworthiness, and those who think it does not. This is the issue commonly called ‘moral luck.’ The chapter first seeks to recast the problem, finding it to be ill-cast as a problem of luck. It then defends the view that causation of a harm matters to overall blameworthiness. It does so after rejecting all extent arguments for this conclusion in the existing literature, arguing not just that they are bad but that they are hopeless. The defense offered in the chapter is first put in foundationalist justificatory mode and then in non-foundationalist justificatory mode.

Keywords:   moral luck, circumstantial luck, result luck, control, resentment, guilt, foundationalism, non-foundationalism

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