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Placing BlameA Theory of the Criminal Law$
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Michael S. Moore

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199599493

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.001.0001

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Closet Retributivism

Closet Retributivism

(p.83) 2 Closet Retributivism
Placing Blame

Michael Moore (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter has two aims. First, it seeks to develop an adequate taxonomy of possible (and historically advocated) theories of punishment. Utilitarian, retributive, rehabilitative, and mixed theories are distinguished, with subspecies of each.. Second, the chapter presents a set of thought experiments making it difficult to hold the utilitarian, rehabilitative, or mixed theories of punishment. That leaves retributivist theories as the preferred basis for punishment, assuming we are to punish at all. The aim of the chapter is not so much to justify retributivism as to show that each of us is, intuitively at least, a retributivist – a ‘closet retributivist’, perhaps, but a retributivist nonetheless.

Keywords:   retributivism, utilitarianism, deterrence, reform, mixed theories, rehabilitation, punishment

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