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Placing BlameA Theory of the Criminal Law$
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Michael S. Moore

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199599493

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.001.0001

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An Overview of The Criminal Law’s Theory of The Person

An Overview of The Criminal Law’s Theory of The Person

(p.610) 15 An Overview of The Criminal Law’s Theory of The Person
Placing Blame

Michael Moore (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Once one sees that criminal law presuppose that those subject to it must at least be rational agents, the subject of the previous chapter, the question arises as to what other fundamental attributes the law might suppose persons to have. The chapter explores a number of such features: autonomy (in four different senses), emotionality, unified character, unified consciousness, and Intentionality. Some further features are often assumed to be presupposed about persons by the law, namely freedom of the will, mind-stuff existing outside the natural world, souls, and the like; but these are rejected as legal presuppositions about persons and moral agency.

Keywords:   Intentionality, character, autonomy, free will, emotionality, consciousness, souls

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