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Placing BlameA Theory of the Criminal Law$
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Michael S. Moore

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199599493

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.001.0001

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Intentions and Mens Rea

Intentions and Mens Rea

(p.449) 11 Intentions and Mens Rea
Placing Blame

Michael Moore (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

No one just intends – they intend that something be the case. Intentions take objects, they have content, they exhibit Intentionality. This fact about the psychology of intentions becomes important because the gradations in culpability explored in chapter 9 depend on there being some non-arbitrary way to individuate intentions by their objects. Three views of these objects – in terms of real world objects, sentences, or propositions – are considered. A moral test (in terms of non-identical in fact but equivalent in morality intentions) that would bypass these thorny metaphysical issues is also considered but rejected.

Keywords:   direct intentions, oblique intentions, specific intent, general intent, intent individuation, content of intention, closeness doctrine, propositional objects

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