A great deal of cognitive problem solving takes the form of thinking in mental imagery. This chapter illustrates these capacities and analyzes imagistic cognition into several aspects: object tracking, imagistic representation of causation, and perceptual similarity spaces, which include acquired dimensions grounded in representations of particular objects. The chapter also argues that the cognitive powers of nonhuman animals and prelinguistic human infants are limited to imagistic cognition. As case studies, the chapter examines the achievements of infants in Paul C. Quinn's experiments and the achievements of chimpanzees in Sue Savage‐Rumbaugh's experiments and argues that they can be explained in terms of imagistic cognition.
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