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Meaning in Life$
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Thaddeus Metz

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199599318

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599318.001.0001

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Rejecting Supernaturalism

Rejecting Supernaturalism

(p.139) 8 Rejecting Supernaturalism
Meaning in Life

Thaddeus Metz

Oxford University Press

Chapters 5 through 7 demonstrate that the most promising motivation for holding any form of supernaturalism is the perfection thesis that meaning requires engagement with a maximally conceivable value. Chapter 8 provides reason to favour a contrary 'imperfection thesis' that there can be meaning without perfection. After rejecting extant arguments against the perfection thesis and supernaturalism, suggested by the likes of Brooke Alan Trisel and Kurt Baier, it presents a new one, namely, that most readers cannot coherently hold such views, given plausible beliefs to which they are already committed. This chapter also specifies the imperfection thesis, arguing for the best view of exactly how much less than perfect value in the natural world one must engage with in order for one’s life to be meaningful all things considered. In doing so, it addresses how human nature and transhumanism bear on whether a life counts as meaningful on balance.

Keywords:   Brooke Alan Trisel, Human Nature, Imperfection, Kurt Baier, Meaningful Life, Naturalism, Transhumanism

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