The chapter promotes the idea that properties, ways substances are, are powerful qualities. The familiar distinction between categorical and dispositional properties is grounded in a confusion inherited from philosophers hoping to ‘analyze away’ talk of dispositions. A power or disposition is for a particular kind of manifestation with particular sorts of reciprocal manifestation partner, but a disposition need never be manifested. The idea that dispositions are relations stems from imagining that because dispositions are typically characterized ‘relationally’ — by reference to what they are for — it follows that dispositions are relations. Unger’s criticism of ‘scientiphicalism’ is examined and shown to be partly right, partly wrong. An account of secondary qualities as arrangements of primaries is advanced, and the idea that claims concerning contingency require no defense is questioned.
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