Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Crime, Punishment, and ResponsibilityThe Jurisprudence of Antony Duff$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Rowan Cruft, Matthew H. Kramer, and Mark R. Reiff

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199592814

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592814.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 15 November 2019

Is Intent Constitutive of Wrongdoing?

Is Intent Constitutive of Wrongdoing?

Chapter:
(p.193) 12 Is Intent Constitutive of Wrongdoing?
Source:
Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility
Author(s):

Peter Westen

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592814.003.0012

According to conventional wisdom, criminal conduct consists of two inculpatory elements: wrongdoing, which is a function of socially-undesirable harms, and risks that can be defined independently of an actor's subjectivity; and culpability, which is a function of an actor's subjectivity. Antony Duff challenges this paradigm by advancing a thesis that some commentators equate with the much mooted Doctrine of Double Effect. Beginning in Intention, Agency, and Criminal Responsibility (1990) and continuing in Criminal Attempts (1995), and Answering for Crime (2007), Duff argues that the intent with which a person acts (as opposed to his willingness to endanger) can affect not only his culpability in acting but also the wrongfulness of what he does. This chapter critically examines Duff's thesis, distinguishing it from the much-criticised Doctrine of Double Effect, but questioning whether Duff shows that intent is constitutive of wrongdoing sufficient to justify the normative weight he accords it and, if he does so, whether he shows that willingness to inflict harm is not also constitutive of harm.

Keywords:   culpability, double effect, Doctrine of Double Effect, endangerment, intent, wrongdoing

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .