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Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics$
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D. M. Armstrong

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199590612

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.001.0001

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Laws of Nature

Laws of Nature

Chapter:
(p.35) Chapter 5 Laws of Nature
Source:
Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics
Author(s):

David M. Armstrong

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.003.0005

Once one has ‘sparse’ universals it is natural to think that an account of laws of nature can be given in terms of relations between these universals. Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and myself all proposed this view at much the same time. My own first version was subjected to trenchant criticism by David Lewis and Bas van Fraassen. My second attempt, which is to see laws as causal (or nomic) connections between states of affairs types, is here argued to meet these difficulties. Although the connection remains contingent, it sets up a direct connection between states of affairs. Hence it is stronger than Hume‐type theories, constituting a ‘middle way’. This leads to a singularist theory of causal connection, with the laws of nature (themselves universals) instantiated in these causal/nomic connections. Progress can then be made with the problem of induction (inference to the best explanation). Typical laws of nature are functional, expressed in equations, and involving determinable properties only. The complication this leads to is addressed. It is suggested further that we have direct perceptual awareness of causal action on our own bodies.

Keywords:   laws of nature, Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, David Lewis, Bas van Fraassen, states of affairs types, causal singularism, functional laws, determinable properties, determinate properties, perception of causality

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