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Knowledge on Trust$
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Paul Faulkner

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199589784

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589784.001.0001

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Trust and the Uptake of Testimony

Trust and the Uptake of Testimony

(p.113) 5 Trust and the Uptake of Testimony
Knowledge on Trust

Paul Faulkner (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that the non-reductive theory of testimony suffers two failings. First, the idea that we have an entitlement to believe testimony gets things wrong descriptively. Either it wrongly takes gullibly formed beliefs to be warranted, or it wrongly takes beliefs formed on trust to be unwarranted. Second, the idea that we have an entitlement to believe testimony gets things wrong normatively. Rather, testimonial uptake must be reasonable for an audience. Existing non-reductive theories misconceive what motivates this requirement, taking it to be imposed by an argument from testimonial error when it is motivated by the problem of cooperation. And the responses that Tyler Burge and John McDowell give to the argument from error do not allow a response to this problem.

Keywords:   testimony, epistemology, knowledge, warrant, non-reductive theory, entitlement, gullibility, cooperation, trust, Tyler Burge, John McDowell

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