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The Pragmatic MaximEssays on Peirce and pragmatism$
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Christopher Hookway

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199588381

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588381.001.0001

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Interrogatives and Uncontrollable Abductions

Interrogatives and Uncontrollable Abductions

Chapter:
(p.71) 4 Interrogatives and Uncontrollable Abductions
Source:
The Pragmatic Maxim
Author(s):

Christopher Hookway

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588381.003.0005

Throughout his career, Peirce denied that psychology could make any contribution to normative logic. After clarification of the anti-psychologist position, the chapter evaluates Peirce’s arguments against psychologism. Peirce’s objections to using psychology in logic are manifested most clearly in his detailed criticisms of John Dewey’s new approach to logical theory which drew on Darwinian ideas and sought a rapprochement between logic and psychology. Peirce’s own approach to logical theory involved using phenomenology to identify a system of categories and then using the result to provide foundations for the normative sciences of aesthetics, ethics, and logic.

Keywords:   psychologism, logic, Peirce, Dewey, Sigwart, phenomenology, categories, Darwinianism

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