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Pursuing Meaning$
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Emma Borg

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199588374

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588374.001.0001

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Intention-Sensitive Expressions

Intention-Sensitive Expressions

Chapter:
(p.112) Chapter 4 Intention-Sensitive Expressions
Source:
Pursuing Meaning
Author(s):

Emma Borg

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588374.003.0004

This chapter examines the role of speaker intentions in issues of reference determination for context-sensitive expressions, focusing on demonstratives. Intuitively, the referent of a token utterance of ‘that’ is fixed (at least in part) by the speaker's intentions. However, if this is right it causes a potential problem for semantic minimalism. The chapter begins by setting out the nature of this problem and proceeds to explore three putative solutions. First, the assumption that speaker intentions fix reference in these cases may be rejected; second, it may be held that current speaker intentions are relevant but that they can be accommodated within a formal semantic theory; third, reference determination and semantic content may be held strictly apart. The first two of these moves, termed respectively ‘conventionalism’ and ‘non-inferentialism’, are rejected. However it is shown that the third move provides an appealing way for the minimalist to accommodate the content of context-sensitive expressions.

Keywords:   demonstratives, context-sensitive expressions, intentions, mindreading, bodyreading, conventionalism, theory-theory approaches to mind, simulation theory, mirror neurons

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