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The Nature and Value of KnowledgeThree Investigations$
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Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199586264

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001

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Anti‐Luck Virtue Epistemology

Anti‐Luck Virtue Epistemology

Chapter:
(p.48) 3 Anti‐Luck Virtue Epistemology
Source:
The Nature and Value of Knowledge
Author(s):

Duncan Pritchard (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.003.0003

This chapter canvasses two master intuitions about knowledge: the ability intuition and the anti-luck intuition. It argues that a robust anti-luck epistemology, which takes the anti-luck intuition as central, cannot accommodate the ability intuition, and that a robust virtue epistemology which takes the ability intuition as central cannot accommodate the anti-luck intuition. It is suggested that the proper moral to be extracted from this impasse is that we need an anti-luck virtue epistemology — a theory of knowledge which incorporates two separate epistemic conditions designed to accommodate each of the two master intuitions about knowledge. Such a view can accommodate a range of key examples of interest to epistemologists. A genealogical diagnosis of the structure of knowledge is offered which supports this proposal. Anti-luck virtue epistemology can adequately respond to those versions of the value problem for knowledge which do not trade on the intuition that knowledge is finally valuable.

Keywords:   anti-luck epistemology, anti-luck virtue epistemology, cognitive ability, epistemic luck, epistemic value, knowledge, virtue epistemology

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