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The Nature and Value of KnowledgeThree Investigations$
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Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199586264

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001

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Knowledge of Action

Knowledge of Action

(p.241) 11 Knowledge of Action
The Nature and Value of Knowledge

Adrian Haddock (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that knowledge of one's intentional action can also be understood as knowledge of a transparent fact, which constitutes an entitlement to the belief this knowledge involves. It describes some differences between this account and the above account of the second-order knowledge involved in visual knowledge. It elucidates the connection between knowledge of intentional action and the above account of the value of knowledge. Finally, the present account of knowledge of intentional action is compared with Anscombe's account of such knowledge. According to both accounts, knowledge of this sort is not only knowledge without observation, but practical knowledge, on account of (i) the kind of entitlement it involves; (ii) the fact that it is acquired ‘in intention’; and (iii) the fact that it has a mind-to-world and a world-to-mind direction of fit.

Keywords:   Anscombe, intentional action, knowledge without observation, practical knowledge

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