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Essays on Skepticism$
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Anthony Brueckner

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199585861

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.001.0001

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Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism

Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism

Chapter:
(p.86) 5 Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism
Source:
Essays on Skepticism
Author(s):

Anthony Brueckner

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0006

This chapter examines the viability of using Tyler Burge's anti-individualism as the basis for an anti-sceptical strategy. Anti-individualism seems to hold that if an intentional mental state has a specific determinate content, then this requires that certain physical conditions in one's environment obtain. Which? That is a question that is difficult to explore. Various answers are discussed and rejected. For example, the anti-individualist isn't committed to holding that in order for one to think that water is dripping, water must exist at some time in one's causal environment. But could the anti-individualist argue that in order to think that thought, there must at least be a physical world, to ‘nail down’ its determinate content? A ‘No’ answer is argued in this chapter.

Keywords:   Tyler Burge, Davidson, Putnam, Searle, anti-individualism, content

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