- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Transcendental Arguments I
- 2 Transcendental Arguments II
- 3 The Anti‐Skeptical Epistemology of the Refutation of Idealism
- 4 Modest Transcendental Arguments
- 5 Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism
- 6 Stroud's “Transcendental Arguments” Reconsidered
- 7 Brains in a Vat
- 8 Semantic Answers To Skepticism
- 9 Trees, Computer Program Features, and Skeptical Hypotheses
- 10 Cartesian Skepticism, Content Externalism, and Self‐Knowledge
- 11 Terms of Envatment<sup>1</sup> (with Jon Altschul)
- 12 Charity and Skepticism
- 13 The Omniscient Interpreter Rides Again
- 14 Singular Thought and Cartesian Philosophy
- 15 Scepticism about Knowledge of Content
- 16 Knowledge of Content and Knowledge of the World
- 17 Externalism and Memory
- 18 What an Anti‐Individualist Knows <i>A Priori</i>
- 19 The Characteristic Thesis of Anti‐Individualism
- 20 Brewer on the McKinsey Problem
- 21 Wright On The McKinsey Problem
- 22 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent
- 23 The Resiliency of the McKinsey Problem
- 24 Epistemic Universalizability Principles
- 25 Why Nozick is a Sceptic
- 26 Skepticism and Epistemic Closure
- 27 Unfair to Nozick
- 28 Problems with the Wright Route to Skepticism
- 29 The Structure of the Skeptical Argument
- 30 Klein on Closure and Skepticism
- 31 The Elusive Virtues of Contextualism
- 32 Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge
- 33 Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson
- 34 Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism
- 35 Some Comfort for the Closure Skeptic
- 36 ∼K∼SK
- Bibliography
- Index
Some Comfort for the Closure Skeptic
Some Comfort for the Closure Skeptic
- Chapter:
- (p.358) 35 Some Comfort for the Closure Skeptic
- Source:
- Essays on Skepticism
- Author(s):
Anthony Brueckner
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter addresses a recent challenge from Marian David and Ted Warfield: Can you state a closure principle that is both plausible and usable in a sceptical argument that applies to every putative knower? They argue ‘No’ while the author replies ‘Yes’.
Keywords: closure, Marian David, Ted Warfield, positioned to know, justification
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Transcendental Arguments I
- 2 Transcendental Arguments II
- 3 The Anti‐Skeptical Epistemology of the Refutation of Idealism
- 4 Modest Transcendental Arguments
- 5 Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism
- 6 Stroud's “Transcendental Arguments” Reconsidered
- 7 Brains in a Vat
- 8 Semantic Answers To Skepticism
- 9 Trees, Computer Program Features, and Skeptical Hypotheses
- 10 Cartesian Skepticism, Content Externalism, and Self‐Knowledge
- 11 Terms of Envatment<sup>1</sup> (with Jon Altschul)
- 12 Charity and Skepticism
- 13 The Omniscient Interpreter Rides Again
- 14 Singular Thought and Cartesian Philosophy
- 15 Scepticism about Knowledge of Content
- 16 Knowledge of Content and Knowledge of the World
- 17 Externalism and Memory
- 18 What an Anti‐Individualist Knows <i>A Priori</i>
- 19 The Characteristic Thesis of Anti‐Individualism
- 20 Brewer on the McKinsey Problem
- 21 Wright On The McKinsey Problem
- 22 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent
- 23 The Resiliency of the McKinsey Problem
- 24 Epistemic Universalizability Principles
- 25 Why Nozick is a Sceptic
- 26 Skepticism and Epistemic Closure
- 27 Unfair to Nozick
- 28 Problems with the Wright Route to Skepticism
- 29 The Structure of the Skeptical Argument
- 30 Klein on Closure and Skepticism
- 31 The Elusive Virtues of Contextualism
- 32 Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge
- 33 Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson
- 34 Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism
- 35 Some Comfort for the Closure Skeptic
- 36 ∼K∼SK
- Bibliography
- Index
