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The Philosophy of Criminal LawSelected Essays$
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Douglas Husak

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199585038

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585038.001.0001

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Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?

Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?

(p.17) 1 Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?
The Philosophy of Criminal Law

Douglas Husak (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues against the claim that criminal liability is and ought to be imposed only for an act. No persuasive argument for this claim has yet been given. As an alternative, it suggests that criminal liability is and ought to be imposed only for states of affairs over which persons exercise a sufficient degree of control. It explores the advantages of this alternative principle for the justifiability of status criminality and the punishment of mental states.

Keywords:   act, voluntariness, omission, status, liability, responsibility, agency

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