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Happiness for Humans$
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Daniel C. Russell

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199583683

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583683.001.0001

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Epictetus and the Stoic Self

Epictetus and the Stoic Self

(p.156) 7 Epictetus and the Stoic Self
Happiness for Humans

Daniel C. Russell

Oxford University Press

This chapter begins the argument that the Stoics’ thesis that virtuous activity is sufficient for happiness stems not from their belief that virtuous activity is the only good, but from the conjunction of that belief and their conception of virtuous activity as the exercise of choice in circumstances from which the self is always distinct. This chapter examines Epictetus’ articulation of that conception of activity. Following a close reading of Epictetus, Discourses I.1., the chapter argues that Epictetus’ conception of virtuous activity is an orthodox Stoic view.

Keywords:   activity, discourses, Epictetus, Margaret Graver, Handbook, Enchiridion, Hierocles, self, Seneca, Richard Sorabji, stoicism, sufficiency of virtue for happiness, virtuous activity, vulnerability

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