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Emergence in Mind$
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Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199583621

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.001.0001

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Emergent Causation and Property Causation

Emergent Causation and Property Causation

(p.69) 6 Emergent Causation and Property Causation
Emergence in Mind

Paul Noordhof

Oxford University Press

The chapter defends the application, and verdicts of a counterfactual theory of causation, to the question of property causation. In particular, the challenges that non‐reductive physicalism and emergent dualism place upon such an account are evaluated. This involves providing a particular characterization of the difference between non‐reductive physicalism and emergent dualism, considering whether this characterization is defensible under various views about the nature of properties, and distinguishing two types of emergent causation only one type of which involves emergent properties.

Keywords:   property causation, emergence, physical, causal theory of properties, counterpart, counterfactual, emergent causation, non‐reductive physicalism, emergent dualism

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